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Abstract
At the time that this thesis is printed, we are reminded of the tumultuous relationship
between North Korea and the United States every day. If we follow the mainstream news
regularly, it seems like we are on a steady path to war. Ultimately, this paper is centered
around the question: what is the best foreign policy strategy for both countries to achieve
respective goals, without descending into armed conflict? I mainly researched journal
articles, official statements and primary sources to form a sound knowledge of how this
relationship has evolved to the current state of affairs. Specifically, I evaluated the failures of
the last three U.S. Presidents and used their shortcomings to explain limitations in current
foreign policy strategy. I also attempted to show North Korean concerns and perspectives
regarding these issues, as our cultural and national biases often prevent us from seeing this
issue with true clarity.

For some background, I combined personal experience with a primary source
interview. I then used scholarly articles from a variety of ideological lenses to analyze events
from multiple viewpoints. Throughout the paper, I try to force readers to think critically
about these events, rather than consume them through short headlines on the evening news. I
learned that there is major potential for diplomatic alternatives to armed conflict in this
relationship. I also learned that the current foreign policy strategies both countries are
engaging in do not serve their best interests, or help to achieve foreign policy goals. These
ideas are crucial to understand, as the likelihood for war between North Korea and the United
States becomes greater each day. Furthermore, this war would result in immense loss of life
and the displacement of millions of innocent people.
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Introduction
As modern technology advances our ability to wage nuclear war, the United States’
relationship with North Korea has never been more important. With each North Korean
nuclear test, the intricacies of the balance of power between the two countries become less
manageable. Moreover, with each provocation millions of people edge closer to nuclear
annihilation. Therefore, the scholarly community has a fundamental need to review foreign
policy strategies in the relationship between North Korea and the United States. This paper
proposes a new policy direction, geared towards greater diplomacy and trust building, in
order to maximize the likelihood that the two countries will achieve foreign policy goals
without resorting to the use of force.
In July 2017, I travelled to South Korea and worked near the demilitarized zone
between North and South Korea for three weeks. As part of a program provided by the U.S.
Army, I shadowed a Tank Platoon Leader in the 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, of the
1st Battalion, 9th Cavalry Regiment. The First Lieutenant I followed was extremely busy as
he led his soldiers through gunnery, a month-long training exercise that ensures the readiness
of tank crews and their ability to wage war. I observed the routines, morale, and atmosphere
of these soldiers. For years I had read about the 38th parallel in history textbooks, but
experiencing it was a whole different phenomenon. As soon as I arrived, every leader I met
stressed the importance of readiness. The Eighth Army, which comprises all U.S. troops in
Korea, has a central motto: fight tonight. Every soldier in my brigade had to be able to
assume his battle position within four hours of being called to alert, and there were several
drills while I was there to test this keenness. As we discuss new strategies for foreign policy
engagement with North Korea, it is important to remember how close to combat we are
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already. The entire time I was in South Korea, we were constantly reminded that the
demilitarized zone represents an armistice, not a peace treaty and that shots are routinely
fired.

This armistice has lasted for generations, and it is crucial to understand the nature and
origin of these hostilities. North Korea was born out of cold war conflict, and the Korean
War of 1950-1953 was largely a proxy war between the United States and the Soviet Union.
After just three months of fighting, North Korea had pushed South Korean and U.S. forces to
a tiny swath of land known as the Busan Peninsula. Tantalizingly close to gaining control of
the entire Korean Peninsula, North Korea was flanked by General MacArthur of the United
States at Incheon. The U.S. General split North Korean forces and waged a bloody war,
pushing North Korean soldiers all the way to the Yalu River. Despite several warnings from
China, U.S. forces crossed the Yalu River forcing China to intervene. The following two
years involved devastating fighting and had extremely destructive effects on North Korean
land and people. An estimated 750,000 North Koreans died while 145,000 went missing
(Millett 2008). The United States air force decimated North Korean cities and towns,
wreaking havoc with its superior warplanes. Finally, on July 27, 1953 North and South Korea
signed an armistice that divided the Peninsula at the 38th parallel. This armistice still exists
today, and a peace treaty has never been signed. For the average American, the Korean war is
one in a collection of several ideological battles the United States has become embroiled in.
For Koreans, this incredibly divisive conflict still hugely impacts contemporary events and
relationships (Cumings 2011, 54).
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This story of North Korea’s origin is critical to recognize and still has implications
today. North Korea is a nation born out of hostility and mistrust towards the United States. It
has viewed the United States as a foreign invader for the last 65 years not only because of the
Korean War but because of the immense military presence that the U.S. maintains just south
of the 38th parallel. From the U.S. perspective, North Korea is the last stand of communist
hostility in Asia and still presents security challenges to hegemony in the region. North
Korea’s nuclear program also poses a key threat to the United States and its allies, all of
whom use nuclear weapons as a way to maintain power in the international hierarchy. In a
more ideological way too, North Korea represents the antithesis to the free, capitalist
democracy that some argue the United States aims to spread to the entire world (Boggs 2017,
228). Despite this long adversarial relationship, there is still hope for more peaceful paths if
the right policy is pursued.

This optimism for a peaceful relationship is sustained by many U.S. and North
Korean officials, regardless of the incendiary news clippings we see day after day. For a
shock and awe effect, many media outlets replay aggressive sound bites on repeat to the point
that they verge on declarations of war (Seo 2008, 5). On November 29, 2017, I interviewed
the U.S. State Department’s Special Representative for North Korea policy, Joseph Yun.
Deputy Assistant Security Yun 1 is, in his words, “probably the only one in the U.S.
government that communicates to North Koreans” and gives fascinating insight into what the
relationship is really like, outside of the media frenzy. His responses also show how current
actions and policies are failing to meet their objectives. By looking at the issue from multiple
1

My interview with Deputy Assistant Secretary Joseph Yun is included in the appendix of this paper.
Throughout the paper, I refer to him as DAS Yun. He is the U.S. government’s primary diplomat and means of
communication with North Korea.
6

perspectives, this paper analyzes the failures of past and current foreign policy strategies in
the United States’ relationship with North Korea. Through this discussion, the paper then
points out specific steps to improve relations before catastrophe strikes. Right now, there is
nothing more urgent for international security than greater diplomacy between these two
countries.

Chapter One: The Failure of Recent Policies
Bush Administration: Militant Internationalism 2002-2008
In a strong departure from diplomatic attempts made during the Clinton
Administration, United States President George Bush pursued a much more coercive strategy
engaging North Korea. Similar to past changes in leadership and political party of the White
House, the Bush administration felt it needed to correct past mistakes and forge a new
strategy regarding North Korea. The lack of coordination and proper implementation of
President Clinton’s Agreed Framework from 1994-2000 cost the United States millions of
dollars in food aid with no real change to North Korea’s nuclear advancements. The
perception that North Korea had taken advantage of US diplomacy, especially for newly
emboldened Republicans, prompted a significant change in thinking towards North Korea
(Hwang). Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld repeated this view in a
number of interviews and speeches in the first few months of the Bush presidency (Clemens
238). To truly understand the situation, the Bush Administration conducted a complete
review of United States policy towards North Korea in June 2001. Bush administration
officials deemed past policies too lenient and ushered in a new wave of forceful measures
against North Korea. To be better informed for a current policy recommendation, we must
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understand the reasons why the Bush administration’s hawkish approach failed to achieve
foreign policy goals. It is also important to recognize the North Korean perspective when
analyzing this failed foreign policy strategy.

The changes in approach immediately took impact upon Bush’s inauguration. Instead
of offering incentives to the Kim regime for halting the North Korean nuclear program, the
Bush administration closed the arena for negotiations. Officials announced that North Korean
nuclear disarmament and a serious reduction in conventional war systems would be
preliminary requirements for any cooperation from the US and its allies (Matray 2013, 154).
This marks a serious change in thinking and perspective in US foreign policy. In the eyes of
the Bush administration, North Korea had become a hostile actor whose behavior directly
threatened US interests and security. In his State of the Union address in January 2002,
President Bush included North Korea among the three nations in the “axis of evil.” In greater
detail, Bush explained that North Korea was “a regime arming itself with missiles and
weapons of mass destruction while starving its own citizens”. North Korea, along with Iran
and Iraq, “pose a grave danger to the safety of our world” (Bush 2002). Interestingly, Bush
ends this decree on the axis of evil with a statement that summarizes his administration’s
entire foreign policy outlook towards North Korea: “The price of indifference would be
catastrophic” (Bush 2002). This is particularly relevant because it captures how Bush
administration officials and perhaps even the President himself regarded the diplomatic
efforts of the previous decade.
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Despite Clinton’s efforts to reach out to the isolated country, the lack of follow
through and verification of North Korea’s adherence to the United States’ terms was seen as
indifference, and really nothing more (Clemens 2004, 236). This is important because it helps
us understand the rationale behind Bush’s axis of evil speech and push into militant
internationalism. The turn away from diplomacy with North Korea fits with broader shifts in
policy away from Clinton-era thinking. These changes were so pronounced that policy
analysts noted at the time that Bush was really embracing the ABC policy: “Anything But
Clinton” (Matray 2013, 148).

Throughout this paper, it is important to keep asking whether diplomatic efforts are
impossible or were simply abandoned too quickly. Tensions escalated quickly in the first two
years of the Bush administration. After Bush’s policy review towards North Korea in June
2002, reports began to surface that North Korea had been using high-speed centrifuge
machines to enrich uranium in 2001. In October 2002, Assistant Secretary of State James
Kelly traveled to North Korea to engage the regime in talks (Matray 2013, 157). However,
instead of negotiating, Kelly laid out the seemingly-immovable US position on the matter.
For the United States to even continue discussion, Kelly explained, North Korea would have
to halt its uranium enrichment program as it violated the Agreed Framework. North Korean
officials ended the talks abruptly, denying the existence of such a program and stating that
the United States “had no real desire to resolve issues” and was really trying to “disarm and
change North Korea’s system by means of coercion, force and pressure” (Pritchard 2007,
48). In many ways, the United States did in fact pursue a strategy of coercion, force and
pressure. The following month in November 2002, President Bush initiated the first sanctions
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against North Korea in nearly a decade, blocking oil and grain shipments to North Korea.
Several months after the ‘axis of evil’ state of the union address, in December 2002, North
Korea expelled inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency who were on a
routine visit as part of the Agreed Framework and Non-Proliferation Treaty. One month later,
North Korea reactivated its graphite reactor at the Yongbyon nuclear facility (Sorenson 2003,
15). The facility is North Korea’s central testing and production site for nuclear activities, as
it was never fully dismantled because of lack of oversight in the Agreed Framework. Only a
few days later, North Korea officially withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, fully
raising alarm from the UN and international powers. The United States responded by
officially abandoning the Agreed Framework, solidifying the near-complete deterioration of
relations between the two countries (Moon and Bae 2003, 23).

These events are necessary to examine because they show how quickly diplomatic
efforts were abandoned, and in a broader sense how this strategy failed to achieve foreign
policy goals. Can we use these lessons to launch a new strategy? Already, we can see that
responding with mistrust and reacting from a purely defensive mindset only worsens
prospects for both countries.

In the months after the United States’ successful overthrow of Saddam Hussein,
President Bush intensified pressure on North Korea using political sway with other world
powers. In May 2003 the United States proposed the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),
which attempted to unite UN security council members to enforce sanctions on the export of
nuclear materials. Russia, China, and South Korea rejected the initiative in order to keep
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normalized relations with North Korea possible (Matray 2013, 161). Finally, in August 2003,
North Korea agreed to multilateral talks involving the United States, South Korea, China,
Russia and Japan, now known as the Six-Party Talks (Kihl and Kim 2014, 257). In the first
few convenings of the talks, fundamental issues arose involving the concessions the United
States was willing to give North Korea. Most notably, the United States refused to make any
concession until North Korea had proven the end of its nuclear activities. North Korea, along
with China and South Korea to a certain extent, argued that this position was unreasonable
and could only happen if the United States signed a binding agreement promising to not
invade North Korea (Matray 2013, 154).

In our interview, DAS Yun admits that North Korea has maintained the desire for a
non-aggression pact from the United States since 2003. This helps us form a more objective
view of North Korea. A non-aggression pact is a rational goal for the North Korean regime to
desire, seeing as its main concern has always been a U.S. invasion justified by American
exceptionalism.

The political stalemate continued until September 2005, when North Korea finally
agreed to halt its nuclear weapons program, rejoin the Non-Proliferation Treaty and allow
IAEA inspectors inside the country (Bajoria and Xu 2015). In exchange, the United States
would lift certain sanctions and deliver food aid. However, just as quickly as the agreement
materialized, it fell apart. In November 2005 the United States sanctioned the Banco Delta
Asia, a Macau-based bank suspected of laundering hundreds of millions of dollars for North
Korea (Bajoria and Xu 2015). In response, North Korea tested its first long-range missile and
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conducted its first underground nuclear explosion in 2006. Determined not to let these
negotiations disintegrate completely, China and South Korea pressed North Korea to resume
talks. In February 2007, the group met for the sixth time. North Korea agreed to dismantle its
nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of US sanctions. This was arguably the most
successful agreement yet, as North Korea allowed US inspectors to observe the destruction of
thousands of fuel rods and other nuclear materials (Bajoria and Xu 2015).

Relations were beginning to normalize through 2007 and the beginning of 2008 as
more US sanctions were lifted and North Korea engaged more countries diplomatically.
Despite these advancements, the Kim regime failed to comply with verification standards in
2008 and restarted nuclear activities. As 2008 ended, hostility began to build again. Both the
United States and North Korea were experiencing changes in leadership, both unclear how to
proceed with no real goals met. In retrospect, we can use this period in time and its lack of
success to remember how gradual trust-building measures must be, as well as the high level
of commitment required.

As we shift to discuss these events from the North Korean perspective, it is also
important to recognize how the Bush administration’s more active international role
heightened tension and perceived threat by North Korea. The terrorist attack on September
11, 2001 had forced US foreign policy thinking into a much more defensive stance with
uncooperative nations. The hysteria and build up to the invasion of Iraq in US media and
political rhetoric elevated the threat the United States to unfriendly actors, and many analysts
have used the United States’ military engagement in the Middle East to explain North
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Korea’s revitalized pursuit of nuclear weapons(Shapiro 2017). With this in mind, we can
now attempt to understand this downward spiral of relations from a North Korean viewpoint.

Since its inception, North Korea has cultivated a national ideology based on selfreliance and preservation of the state (Olsen 2010, 36). Its most important priority has always
been protecting the regime, system of government and national security. As decades passed
after the Korean War and the United States’ power in the international spectrum only rose,
North Korea became increasingly isolated. After the Soviet Union fell in 1991 North Korea
also became the last remaining strictly-communist state, defying US interests and goals in the
region. When Kim Jong Il took power in 1994, he chose to sacrifice economic modernization
in favor of national defense, justifying military expansion as a necessary precaution to satisfy
security needs. This shift in thinking was officially exemplified in the party’s ideology
change from juche (self-reliance) to songun (military first) (Matray 2013, 144). In our
interview, DAS Yun echoes this idea, “The origin of North Korean nuclear weapons is really
the realization that economically, or culturally, it could no longer compete with South Korea.
They realized after the fall of the Soviet Union that their sponsors, they helpers, have
disappeared and that they were losing this battle with South Korea that is competition”. This
is relevant because it helps us understand North Korea’s seemingly stubborn determination to
possess nuclear weapons. In the eyes of the Kim regime, the only way to ensure state
preservation and security against the United States was to develop nuclear weapons. Many
hardliners in the United States often fail to recognize the image the United States projects
onto the world, and how that can conflict with security goals of other countries. North
Korea’s various attempts to receive a non-aggression pact or some kind of insurance support
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this idea that the United States’ global involvement deeply threatened North Korea. In the
Albright-Cho communication of October 2000, North Korea promised to comply with any
US demands regarding nuclear dismantlement if the US pledged non-hostile intent towards
North Korea (Moon and Bae 2003, 25). Additionally, in 2003, North Korea repeated this
offer, claiming its most important priority was a non-aggression treaty signed by the United
States. Both offers were rejected quickly by the Bush administration, given its jaded view of
the Agreed Framework.

Ultimately, the Bush administration’s failure to achieve foreign policy goals with
North Korea comes back to a misperception of the North Korean regime and its goals. The
United States’ goals were preventing North Korean nuclear capabilities, reducing the Kim
regime's influence in the region, while at the same time reaffirming its power and influence
in Asia. However, many of the favored ways to achieve these goals conflicted with each
other. President Bush publicly stated that diplomatic resolution was the answer to the
conflict, despite many hardliners in his administration, including Vice-President Cheney,
believing that the only answer was a complete transformation in North Korean government
(Gurtov 2005, 65). This school of thought evidently affected the United States’ actions and
explains why Bush pursued actions that would isolate, contain and transform North Korea,
rather than compromise with it. Moreover, the failure to recognize that North Korea was
embroiled in a security dilemma also made Bush policies unsuccessful.

The security dilemma is a theory of international relations that explains the dangers of
defensive thinking and misperception of threat among nations. As a state tries to build up
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defensive capabilities, it increases the threat it poses to competing actors with its new
military capabilities. This results in an increase of tension and military capability, but no real
advantage because competing actors will always attempt to match or surpass their rivals
(Slantchev 2005, 3). In this case, a defensively-minded state like North Korea will continue
to amass military capabilities until state security needs are satisfied. This is a main reason
why the Bush administration’s policies failed. Sanctions, aggressive rhetoric and isolating
measures only toughened North Korea’s commitment to state security and its pursuit of
nuclear weapons. Instead of transforming North Korea into a non-nuclear state through
reassurance measures, the Bush administration hardened the North Korean perception that
the United States was an aggressive actor with ulterior motives of regime change. After eight
years of militant internationalism, North Korea had advanced its nuclear weapons program
and was as isolated as it ever had been.

Obama Administration: Strategic Patience 2008-2016
The Obama administration began its tenure in the White House with high hopes for a
new era in US-North Korea relations. After years of sanctions and hardline rhetoric, many
expected another shift in policy back towards diplomatic efforts. Unfortunately, relations
were tumultuous from the start and did not recover significantly throughout President
Obama’s time in office. As we analyze Obama’s policy of strategic patience, it is important
to think about how greater diplomatic efforts could have succeeded. Just after the first
inauguration, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton travelled to South Korea, China and Japan to
outline the administration’s Asia policies and reaffirm partnerships in the region. During the
trip, Secretary Clinton officially stated the administration's goal “to normalize bilateral
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relations with North Korea and replace the peninsula’s long-standing armistice agreement
with a permanent peace treaty” (Olsen 2010, 54). This is important because it shows a
slightly new direction in US attitudes towards North Korea, and sounds much different to the
hawkish approaches of the Bush administration. However, this statement was made
somewhat in vain as the events of the following months forced the Obama administration to
adopt a much harsher tone.

Just days after Clinton embarked on her trip, North Korea tested another long range
missile a few hundred miles off the coast of Japan. In March 2009, just one month later,
North Korea detained two US journalists who had been found too close to the Chinese-North
Korean border, arrested for alleged espionage. Then, once tensions had just begun to simmer,
North Korea launched the Taepodong 2 ballistic missile over the Pacific Ocean. The Obama
Administration had no choice but to condemn this action and drew support from other world
leaders (Niksch 2011, 19). These provocations by North Korea continued for the next few
months, as the Kim regime put the two US journalists on trial, conducted at least two other
underground nuclear explosions, and rebuked the Obama Administration with fiery rhetoric.

When thinking about these events we must ask, what were the goals of North Korea
in these provocations and shows of brinkmanship? It is clear that the North Korean regime
wanted a swift departure from Bush administration policies and felt that the best way to bring
about this change was to assert its developing military power. By raising the credibility of its
threats and becoming a more pressing issue on the United States’ agenda, North Korea hoped
to gain leverage in the relationship. Quite similar to the mistakes of the Bush administration,
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these aggressive provocations only deepened hostile perceptions of each country by the
other, bringing neither closer to foreign policy goals. The Obama administration responded
with a multilateral approach, organizing a task force headed by State Department officials,
but involving government officials from Japan, China and South Korea. In June 2009, the
United States and South Korea held a massive summit to realign mutual interests but also to
develop a coordinated approach to the recent signs of North Korean aggression (Niksch
2011, 31). Over the next several months, the United States increased sanctions on North
Korea, hoping that they would bring the Kim regime to the negotiating table. However, these
only spawned more bellicose rhetoric and nuclear tests.

All in all, the first two years of President Obama’s relationship with North Korea can
be described as much less active than his predecessors. Many administration officials still
hoped for peaceful negotiations, but did not pursue the matter seriously hoping that North
Korea would be brought to talks eventually (Niksch 2011, 18). As we cultivate our own ideas
for a more diplomatic strategy concerning North Korea and the United States, it is crucial to
take this lesson into account. Doing nothing is nearly as dangerous as being too aggressive.
In our interview, DAS Yun agrees that changes in the relationship will not come from
passivity, “Diplomacy doesn’t just mean talking of course, I think it means juggling many
things together, a big part of that is pressure policy including sanctions, including sanctions
not just against North Korea but those who help North Korea such as China, Russia and so
on”. This discussion shows that diplomacy does not necessarily mean conceding one’s
priorities, rather it means engaging in a multifaceted approach that works with adversarial
actors and not against them.
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In January 2012, Kim Jong Un began his rule as Supreme Leader of North Korea.
This was a huge moment for many watching around the world as it could have meant a
complete reversal in US-North Korea relations. The Obama administration was as hopeful as
anyone, and immediately used this opportunity to alleviate tension. The United States met
with the new North Korean regime officials in Beijing and held the first real talks by both
administrations. The results of these talks produced optimistic results: the Leap Day
Agreement (the agreement was signed on February 29, 2012). The agreement largely
exchanged what both countries needed. In exchange for a large food aid program from the
United States, North Korea would immediately halt all missile and nuclear tests, end uranium
enrichment and all activities at the Yongbyon nuclear facility. While not as detailed or
binding as many hoped, it definitely was a start in a new chapter of the relationship. Despite
these hopeful beginnings, the young untested Kim Jong Un decided to launch a major
satellite into orbit in March 2012, destroying any chances the agreement had to succeed
(Chantlett-Avery et al. 2016, 7).

When analyzing the seemingly-provocative nature of Kim Jong Un in these events, it
is important to adopt a broader perspective. This is a leader who was not the natural heir to
his father’s line of succession, and was relatively unknown before being appointed Supreme
Leader. After Kim Jong Il fell, there was evidently a power vacuum as North Korea is a
country largely built on self-defining myths and totalitarianism. Power must be taken
aggressively and justified quickly, in order to stifle any murmurs of coup or rebellion. To
consolidate power and prove legitimacy, the 29-year old Kim Jong Un used the satellite
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launch to prove he would not bow immediately to the United States. Many analysts argue
that if he did, it would have caused immense trouble for him among his father’s military
leaders (Isozaki 2017, 45). It is essential for us to recognize that there are multiple factors at
play in Kim Jong Un’s provocations, and this perspective is important because it suggests
that stronger diplomatic efforts may have been more successful after Kim Jong Un
established his domestic power.

After the Leap Day Agreement’s failure, the Obama administration continued its
policy of strategic indifference. It condemned Kim Jong Un’s nuclear tests and increased
economic sanctions on North Korea, but largely avoided any direct negotiation or military
action. This policy failed to achieve foreign policy goals for the United States as well, as Kim
Jong Un continued development of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, while
becoming more isolated economically and diplomatically. Between 2012 and 2016, the
United States toned down its involvement with North Korea significantly, instead engaging
in multilateral discussion and using the United Nations as the primary vehicle for sanctions.
After such a tumultuous first few years, this strategy was attractive because it offered the
path of least resistance (Olsen 2010, 39).

In retrospect, this policy was ultimately a failure but at the time presented some potential
benefits. Instead of responding to Kim Jong Un’s provocations and contributing to the
dangerous security dilemma, President Obama shifted responsibility to international
institutions and made North Korean nuclear proliferation a global problem. Similarly, if Kim
Jong Un had grown tired of serious isolation from the international community and attempted
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diplomacy, the process would have been initiated by North Korea, not the United States. That
way if North Korea had reneged on its commitments, the United States could not have been
accused of being too soft on North Korea.

Unfortunately, this rationale rests on the assumption that Kim Jong Un was going to
tone down provocatory missile tests and nuclear ambitions in the face of immense
international scrutiny. This was not the case. On February 12, 2013, North Korea conducted
its first nuclear test under Kim Jong Un in the midst of huge national military parades and
aggressive rhetoric from its state media (McGreal 2013). The next year in March 2014, North
Korea fired hundreds of artillery shells into South Korean waters, prompting the response of
hundreds of shells from South Korea. Both of these acts caused international condemnation
and greater UN sanctions. The lack of serious response by the Obama administration is
important because it shows the extremely cautious nature of Obama’s policy towards North
Korea. In 2015, North Korea continued to publicly laud its nuclear progressions: claims of a
hydrogen bomb, the ability to miniaturize nuclear weapons and the capability to strike the
continental United States, which North Korea would not hesitate to do if the US forced its
hand.

Let us consider possible reasons for these provocations. Are these actions performed
with a defensive mindset, aimed primarily at bridging the security gap between North Korea
and the United States? This explanation makes sense to a certain extent; increasing military
capability is an effective deterrent against US invasion, given the deadly collateral damage
that North Korea could inflict on Seoul and possibly surrounding allies. Another possible
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explanation is that North Korea was attempting to exploit the Obama administration’s
hesitance to escalate tension. Following this line of thinking, North Korea could have been
trying to gain a position of strength at a time when it judged the United States’ leadership to
be the most passive in decades. Both explanations summarize the idea that sanctions had
little to no effect on North Korea.

Finally in February 2016, President Obama unveiled his harshest set of sanctions
towards North Korea: the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act. This law
certainly indicated that North Korean provocations had reached a limit, and actually
translated into serious implications for the international community. The law requires the
President to sanction any entity involved with the North Korean nuclear program or arms
trade, and sanctions any entity found to trade North Korean metals and minerals (U.S.
Congress 2016). Clamping down on North Korean metals around the world put serious
pressure on China; the only country long suspected of sustaining North Korea’s fledgling
economy. Yet by the end of his tenure in the Oval Office, President Obama’s strategy
concerning North Korea largely failed to meet foreign policy goals. Unlike President Bush,
Obama did not make the mistake of escalating tension and increasing threat with no useful
outcome. However, his policy of strategic indifference proved inefficient also. Throughout
the Obama era, North Korea significantly expanded its nuclear weapons program to the point
of operational nuclear missiles and a hydrogen bomb, without any real costs to its regime.

Why were international sanctions so futile? Kim Jong Un’s prioritization of state
security above the economic health and quality of life in North Korea reveals the steadfast
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dedication to his regime’s stability. As we previously discussed, a central founding tenet of
the Worker’s Party of Korea is juche or self-reliance. This self-reliance manifests itself into
harsh North Korean labor camps, in which an estimated 120,000 political prisoners work in
fields or factories and mine crude metals (Walters 2016). The zealous nature of North Korean
indoctrination means that economic sanctions have a much softer effect, as the regime can
simply use its own citizens to sustain a rudimentary, closed economy. Furthermore, this also
means that the effects of international sanctions are dampened, since there is no way North
Korean citizens could speak out against the regime. This is important to recognize when
understanding why Obama’s strategic patience and mild sanctions policies failed.
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Chapter Two
Current Situation: Brinkmanship
Since the inauguration of President Donald Trump, the relationship between the two
countries has entered a brinkmanship stage. The leaders of both states have used
inflammatory language in an apparent attempt to use risk strategies to extract foreign policy
concessions from each other. However, the heightened risk of tensions boiling over into
deadly conflict makes this situation quite relevant for scholars of international relations and
millions of people who live in potential battle zones. The relationship between the United
States and North Korea has gone through optimistic periods of potential compromise and
even longer periods of increasing hostility through recent administrations. In this section, we
must ask: what are each country’s foreign policy goals? Is the current strategy increasing the
likelihood of achieving those goals? The U.S. State Department’s Special Representative for
North Korea policy, Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) Joseph Yun gives us crucial insight
into this administration’s objectives towards North Korea. Nevertheless, we quickly become
aware in this chapter that there is a serious misalignment between the United States’ goals
and its current methods for achieving them.

When asked about the United States’ foreign policy goals concerning North Korea,
DAS Yun replied, “We want to denuclearize North Korea, it’s very clear we want North
Korea to get rid of its nuclear weapons. What perhaps I should add is that this
administration’s policy is not to seek regime change, and it is also not to seek regime
collapse, it is not to seek accelerated reunification, it is also not to use any of this to place US
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troops beyond the DMZ.” This is particularly interesting, given the hostile rhetoric President
Trump engages in regularly.

Stepping back for a moment, it is important to ask: do nuclear weapons make the
world a better or worse place? Kenneth Waltz argues that the gradual spread of nuclear
weapons may be better. From his neoclassical-realism lens, he views the world as a hierarchy
in which states always engage in self-help to maintain or improve relative power. Before
nuclear weapons, conventional war between major actors in this system was prevalent.
Actors engaged in conventional war because the political gains outweighed the costs.
However, Waltz argues that nuclear weaponry changes how willing we are to descend into
battle. The costs are now so immense that real conflict is prolonged much longer, increasing
the chances of resolution (Waltz and Sagan 2003, 43). He points to the fact that nuclear
weapons reduced the chances of war between the United States and the USSR for over forty
years. Furthermore, Waltz asserts that miscalculation with nuclear weapons is much less
likely, given how hard it is not to be aware of the devastating consequences of a nuclear
strike.

Now, we must use Waltz’s argument to ask: would allowing North Korea to keep
nuclear weapons decrease the chances of war between North Korea and the United States?
Given how combative this relationship has become, there is a much higher risk of nuclear
weapons being used in limited retaliation or in miscalculation. The leaders of both countries
have begun to adopt highly provocative measures as commonplace practice, increasing
justification for a preemptive nuclear strike. While Waltz’s idea is valid, it does not
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correspond to the lack of trust and polarization of thinking between North Korea and the
United States. Therefore, this paper’s policy recommendation will support the
denuclearization of North Korea as a main element of resolution.

Currently, relations between the two countries are the most combative we have
witnessed in the last twenty years and can be characterized by what scholars call
brinkmanship. Nobel Laureate Thomas Schelling defines brinkmanship as two or more states
“manipulating the shared risk of war” (Slantchev 2005, 9). In this process, actors
purposefully create risk so that it can only be alleviated when one’s opponent concedes and
satisfies the actor’s goals (Slantchev 9). In the last few months, both U.S. and North Korean
leaders have expressed the willingness to go to war if necessary, often deliberately creating
risk in attempts to force the other’s hand. This strategy really only works if the consequences
for war are devastating for both sides. From the North Korean perspective, war with the
United States and its allies would certainly mean the end of its regime and hegemony over
that part of the Peninsula. War would also mean the loss of millions of innocent lives,
although it is difficult to know how important that is to Kim Jong Un, given the sacrifices he
is willing to make for his regime’s survival.

For the United States, war with North Korea would most likely translate into the deaths of
thousands of American service members, hundreds of thousands of South Korean civilians
and the threat of a nuclear missile from North Korea targeting the continental United States.
Even though war with North Korea is heavily tipped in the United States’ favor, the costs of
dealing with the ramifications of rebuilding North Korea once deadly conflict is over are also
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immense. All in all, brinkmanship between these two nations is a dangerous strategy to
engage in because of the devastating consequences.

Furthermore, brinkmanship is a way to make nuclear threats credible. Due to the
incredibly high costs of retaliation, it becomes difficult to believe a country would envelop
itself in nuclear war and thus take their threats seriously. Engaging in brinkmanship and its
underlying strategies gives more weight to a country’s nuclear threats. This is relevant
because it shows the attractive elements of a less risky foreign policy strategy, like
diplomacy through trust-building measures. Our previous discussion clearly shows that
deterrence or compellence measures by both nations have failed. The United States has been
unable to curb the progression of North Korean nuclear programs through economic
sanctions, while North Korea has been unable to force the United States to the bargaining
table through its nuclear provocations. In other words, we are trapped in a stalemate. At this
point countries must raise the credibility of their threats in order to receive their desired
result. There are a variety of methods to cause alarm in a belligerent actor, as we are
currently witnessing through increased missile tests, aggressive rhetoric and combatants
immediately ready to fight. Slantchev (2005) discusses three ways that states leverage
bargaining power when engaging in brinkmanship: leaving something to chance, limited
retaliation and strategic irrationality.

Leaving something to chance, like strategic irrationality, is a method that depends
heavily on creating certain perceptions of oneself to an opponent. Slantchev (2005) reiterates
that when it is impossible to threaten credibly because the action is so mutually destructive,
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an actor can threaten with the risk or probability that the action will happen is out of
anyone’s control. We can see this in the brinkmanship between the United States and North
Korea as they steadily increase hostility towards one another. Many times throughout 2017,
President Trump and Kim Jong Un repeated that they would have no choice to use military
force if tensions continued to escalate (Walt 2017). Just as Slantchev presents, North Korea
and the United States are trying to gain leverage in their bargaining power by implying that if
the other does not comply, nuclear war may happen despite their best attempts to avert it.
This demonstrates how North Korea and the United States are using brinkmanship strategies
to gain leverage with nuclear threats. Moreover, it is important because we can identify the
high risk and potential problems in this strategy.
Furthermore, the past few months also show the method of limited retaliation.
According to Slantchev (2005), limited retaliation involves only responding in qualified
ways. Instead of massive destruction, minor periods of damage give one’s opponent time to
reconsider and comply with an actor’s desires. This is very applicable to the nature of
relations between North Korea and the United States under Trump and Kim Jong Un.
Increased sanctions and a battle of provocations between both heads of state show the use of
limited retaliation to a significant extent. Tensions began to heat up seriously on May 29,
2017 when North Korea fired a ballistic missile into Japanese waters, just 250 km west of the
Japanese coast line. Amidst international uproar, Kim Jong Un stated clearly his intention to
complete a nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of reaching
major US cities. On July 1, President Trump fired back, “The era of strategic patience with
the North Korean regime has failed. Frankly, that patience is over. The nuclear and ballistic
missile programs of that regime require a determined response” (Tharoor 2017). This strong
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rhetoric is important because even if no direct action is taken, the symbolic rhetoric indicates
a departure from strategic patience shown by the Obama administration.
Just four days later on July 5, 2017, North Korea successfully tested the Hwasong-14,
its first functional ICBM. The crucial difference in these recent provocations by North Korea
and their previous belligerent acts is that they have specifically laid out intention to strike the
United States if pushed, whereas before threats were much more hypothetical and abstract
(Tharoor 2017). Hostilities continued to escalate throughout the summer as Kim Jong Un
threatened to attack Guam if economic sanctions were not dropped (Calamur 2017). This
actions are prime examples of limited retaliation, as Kim Jong Un does not threaten the
continental U.S., but rather remote U.S. territories and spheres of influence. Similarly,
Trump’s heightened sanctions and travel bans reciprocate this method to increase bargaining
power. In a broader sense, these events are relevant because they help us see how both
countries’ use of limited retaliation and brinkmanship escalate risk without delivering any
meaningful results.

On August 9, 2017, President Trump matched his counterpart’s aggressive rhetoric at
a cabinet meeting, warning that “North Korea best not make any more threats to the United
States, they will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen” (Smith 2017). Later
that week the President tweeted, “military solutions are now fully in place, locked and
loaded, should North Korea act unwisely. Hopefully Kim Jong Un will find another path!”
(Trump 2017). This is significant because it shows The Trump administration has also
pressured China to step up its efforts in thwarting the North Korean nuclear program. China
is North Korea’s only trading partner and really the only window North Korea has to the rest
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of the world. Despite the fact that China sanctioned the laundering of North Korean cash
reserves in Chinese banks, other world powers have questioned the enforcement and
commitment of the Chinese government in these efforts (Albert 2017, 4).

Without any analysis or broader thinking, we may first deem the bellicose tweets and
proclamations made by President Trump and Kim Jong Un as unnecessarily irrational. More
than anything, these actions do not seem to correspond with the rational, calm words of DAS
Yun. The senior diplomat noted in our interview that the United States’ goal is “to isolate
them but also to point to them that there could be a better future for them”. This is important
because we can already begin to see the ways in which current policy is failing to meet its
objectives.

Nevertheless, the current strategy is not completely wayward. In addition to limited
retaliation and leaving something to chance, strategic irrationality also is a tool to increase
one’s threat credibility in brinkmanship. Strategic irrationality is a commonly recognized
strategy designed to raise the credibility of one’s threats when engaging in brinkmanship
(Slantchev 2005, 5). It pays to act a bit unhinged. On a much simpler level, this strategy ties
into human nature. If we portray ourselves as irrational and impossible to be reconciled with,
we render ourselves immune to any threat. If our opponent is convinced of our irrationality,
he must back down because it is seemingly impossible to gain any benefit from the situation
anymore. We can use this strategic framework to understand current foreign policy strategy
between North Korea and the United States. It may be hard to believe that heads of state
would willingly portray themselves as out of control, but President Trump is not the first to
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adopt this mode of thinking. President Nixon loved this idea. In 1968, he noted to his
National Security Advisor that it would be extremely beneficial for the Soviet Union and the
North Vietnamese to think he was out of control and might use nuclear weapons, in order to
speed up the process of a peace treaty. While it did not produce the results he was aiming for,
Nixon provided a sound defense of the strategy to his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger:
I call it the Madman Theory. I want the North Vietnamese to believe I’ve reached the
point where I might do anything to stop the war. We’ll just slip the word to them that,
“for God’s sake, you know Nixon is obsessed with Communism. We can’t restrain
him when he’s angry-and he has his hand on the nuclear button”-and Ho Chi Minh
himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace. (Department of State 2008).

This strongly suggests that Nixon thought about the strategy, but the casual nature of
his dialogue may not be entirely convincing. Here is an excerpt from a memorandum
published by US Strategic Command in 1995, titled “Essentials of Post-Cold War
Deterrence”:
Because of the value that comes from the ambiguity of what the U.S. may do to an
adversary if the acts we seek to deter are carried out, it hurts to portray ourselves as
too fully rational...The fact that some elements of the U.S. government may appear to
be potentially ‘out of control’ can be beneficial to creating and reinforcing fears and
doubts within the minds of an adversary’s decision makers...That the U.S. may
become irrational and vindictive if its vital interests are attacked should be a part of
the national persona we project to all adversaries. (U.S. Strategic Command 1995,
14)

Interestingly, this official statement supports the idea that the United States needs to
appear aggressive and “vindictive” in order to cement itself at the top of international
hierarchy. The lack of hesitation President Trump has expressed concerning North Korea
attempts to raise the credibility of his threats and cause North Korea to back down. In a
Nixon-like admission of how useful strategic irrationality is, President Trump noted to
television anchor Mark Halperin that “At a minimum, I want them to think maybe we would
use [nuclear weapons], OK?” (Graff 2017). In his first address to the United Nations General
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Assembly, the President exhibits strategic irrationality, a willingness to fight as well as
several threats, “Rocket man is on a suicide mission for himself and for his regime. If North
Korea does not back down from nuclear provocations, the United States would have no
choice but to totally destroy North Korea” (Smith 2017). This is important because a U.S.
President has never been so brash or direct in his threats to “totally destroy” another country.
The escalation of force and the fact that the President feels that there would be “no choice” in
the matter support his use of strategic irrationality. Moreover, the President also used these
threats to pressure China as well, “It is an outrage that some nations would not only trade
with such a regime, but would arm, supply, and financially support a country that imperils
the world with nuclear conflict”. This statement directly targets China, a tactic that this
administration is exploring more than previous ones.
Also unlike any President before him, Trump uses the social media platform Twitter
to directly communicate with his constituents. His input on a wide range of foreign policy
topics, including a large number concerning North Korea, shows a fascinating use of possible
strategic irrationality. Below is a table of all of the President’s tweets from his account
@realDonaldTrump on North Korea, as well as my short analysis of each one.
Tweet 2

Date

Analysis

Military solutions are now fully
in place, locked and loaded,
should North Korea act
unwisely. Hopefully Kim Jong
Un will find another path!

August 11, 2017

This puts the emphasis on Kim
Jong Un’s actions, implying that
the President is about to
metaphorically push the button
on his “locked and loaded
military solutions”.
Brinkmanship tactic: leaving
something to chance.

Just heard Foreign Minister of

September 23, 2017

The personal attack on Kim Jong

2

All tweets are taken directly from Donald Trump’s official Twitter account @realDonaldTrump. This
collection was compiled on November 17, 2017.
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North Korea speak at U.N. If he
echoes thoughts of Little Rocket
Man, they won't be around much
longer!

Un (“Little Rocket Man”)
portrays that the President views
Kim Jong Un as inferior. This
also shows an irrational
willingness to use nuclear
weapons: “they won’t be around
much longer”. This is also an
example of leaving something to
chance.

I told Rex Tillerson, our
October 1, 2017
wonderful Secretary of State,
that he is wasting his time trying
to negotiate with Little Rocket
Man...Save your energy Rex! I’ll
do what has to be done.

A rare public address targeting
the Secretary of State,
summarizing the idea that
diplomacy is not a viable option
anymore. This shows strategic
irrationality because it reduces
the potential for negotiations,
putting greater emphasis on
military options. The publication
of internal discord within his
team also shows an attempt to
seem impossible to reconcile
with.

Being nice to Rocket Man hasn't
worked in 25 years, why would
it work now? Clinton failed,
Bush failed, and Obama failed. I
won't fail.

October 1, 2017

Here President Trump makes the
United States’ past failures with
North Korea a personal goal,
tied in with his pride, and
making a promise to not fail.

Presidents and their
administrations have been
talking to North Korea for 25
years, agreements made and
massive amounts of money
paid...hasn't worked, agreements
violated before the ink was dry,
makings fools of U.S.
negotiators. Sorry, but only one
thing will work!

October 7, 2017 (2 tweets)

“Only one thing” refers to a
military solution and the use of
nuclear weapons, implying that
President Trump is unable to be
reasoned with anymore.

Our country has been
unsuccessfully dealing with
North Korea for 25 years, giving
billions of dollars & getting
nothing. Policy didn't work!

October 9, 2017

This tweet is quite similar to the
previous one, echoing an
inability to negotiate and loss of
patience.

The North Korean regime has
pursued its nuclear & ballistic
missile programs in defiance of

November 7, 2017

This gives an insight into the
President’s lack of empathy or
perspective that some have
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every assurance, agreement, &
commitment it has made to the
U.S. and its allies. It's broken all
of those commitments...
Why would Kim Jong-un insult
me by calling me "old," when I
would NEVER call him "short
and fat?" Oh well, I try so hard
to be his friend - and maybe
someday that will happen!

shown in defense of North
Korea, again repeating the
President’s loss of patience.
November 11, 2017

A rare admission that the
President could befriend Kim
Jong Un and negotiate with
North Korea, showing a slight
reversal in tone. Still, it is a
personal attack on Kim Jong Un,
implying that he is “short and
fat”.

Met with President Putin of
November 11, 2017
Russia who was at #APEC
meetings. Good discussions on
Syria. Hope for his help to solve,
along with China the dangerous
North Korea crisis. Progress
being made.

Trying to garner multilateral
support and engagement to deal
with North Korea, involving
Russia and China.

China is sending an Envoy and
Delegation to North Korea - A
big move, we'll see what
happens!

Celebrating China’s engagement
of North Korea, a unique facet
of this administration’s
approach.

November 16, 2017

President Trump is not the only one who has adopted strategic irrationality. Kim Jong
Un has cultivated the image that he is unreasonable, destructive and unwilling to negotiate.
As we previously discussed, he began his tenure as Supreme Leader by refusing to cooperate
with the United States in the Leap Day Agreement. His strategic irrationality creates crisis
after crisis, angering and alarming world leaders. Kim Jong Un’s ability to tolerate high
levels of risk helps raise the credibility of his threats, keeping enemies wary of escalations of
force or invasion due to his lack of predictability and tolerance for collateral damage. In the
past year specifically the need to seem irrational or comfortable with high risk situations has
risen, perhaps because the US-North Korea relationship has evolved so quickly into
brinkmanship.
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Unlike President Trump however, Kim Jong Un is much more forceful and takes
action when trying to exhibit strategic irrationality, whereas President Trump’s is mainly
used in rhetoric. North Korea’s increasingly frequent and powerful nuclear missile tests,
followed by national celebrations certainly raise the credibility of his threats, and play up the
idea that Kim Jong Un can’t be reasoned with. His unwavering refusals to adhere to the
international community’s warnings after these tests also add to this image. Furthermore,
Kim Jong Un’s personal battle of rhetoric with President Trump and the United States is
another useful tactic. After President Trump’s fiery speech to the United Nations, Kim Jong
Un broke protocol and personally responded. The Supreme Leader called Trump’s behavior
“mentally deranged” and added that “a frightened dog barks louder.” Kim Jong Un also said
that Trump’s words “convinced me, rather than frightening or stopping me, that the path I
chose is the correct and that one I have to follow to the last.” He threatened, “exercising...a
corresponding, highest level of hardline countermeasure in history” and proclaimed he would
make Trump “pay dearly for his speech” (Davenport 2017).

What can we take away from such an aggressive response? Initially, it appears that
Kim feels that he must match President Trump’s warlike tone and anger. This points back to
the need to consolidate domestic legitimacy. Kim Jong Un could have never responded with
an even tone or without a threat of his own, given that a large base of his power comes from
the idea that North Korea is under constant attack and is threatened by the rest of the world.
The fact that Trump’s words convinced Kim Jong Un that the “path [he] chose is correct and
one [he] has to follow to the last” underscores an unwillingness to cooperate and an attempt
to raise the credibility of his threats. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that North
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Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons has always been justified by the supposed threat of a
U.S. invasion, whether the threat has been real or not. Thus, by directly threatening to
“totally destroy North Korea”, the United States has given Kim Jong Un an explicit reason to
continue its nuclear program to completion.

Additionally, Kim Jong Un exhibits the use of strategic irrationality in less direct
ways. Since he came into power, he has developed a personality cult among his citizens,
arguably more than his father and grandfather. Interviews with regular North Korean citizens
reveal that they have an unnatural, indoctrinated love for their Supreme Leader, but what is
even more noticeable is their unbending refusal to acknowledge any flaw in Kim Jong Un.
The lack of dissent is shocking given the widespread famine, lack of electricity and basic
living necessities that plague most of the country. A useful image to capture Kim’s national
personality cult is the mass games, a semi-annual extravaganza involving hundreds of
thousands of performers, soldiers and spectators. The mass games reinforce Kim’s image as a
god and savior to his citizens (Isozaki 2017, 34). Even though these actions aren’t externally
directed, the tight hold that Kim Jong Un has on his citizens’ thoughts and minds also
displays strategic irrationality. His totalitarian rule and intolerance of political dissent
communicates to the world how ruthless and irrational he wants to seem. Lastly, Kim’s
willingness to starve and torture innocent civilians, as well as his refusals of international
cooperation even in times of famine contribute to the idea that he is irrationally committed to
his ideals and unafraid of the costs of war. This raises the credibility of his threats in an
attempt to force the United States to stand down.
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Now, we must analyze how useful both world leaders’ attempts at brinkmanship are
in achieving their foreign policy goals. Before we delve into the specifics, it is evident that
neither country is achieving the security and safety it is aiming for. Rather, brinkmanship
may be driving both countries towards nuclear war faster than any other strategy in history.
The United States wants to reduce the threat of the North Korean nuclear program to as low
as possible, establish better relations and communication, and increase security in the region
for not only itself but its regional allies South Korea and Japan also. President Trump’s
strategic irrationality, bellicose rhetoric and direct threats towards the unstable Supreme
Leader Kim Jong Un make these goals almost entirely unattainable. As DAS Yun reiterated
over and over in our interview, the goal of the United States is not to seek regime change or
even accelerated reunification, but the President’s actions often imply and state the exact
opposite.
North Korea spawned from a place of hostility with the United States, and the entirety
of its existence has revolved around ensuring that the country survives external threats. Thus,
brinkmanship only perpetuates and reinforces the idea that nuclear missiles are the only
option to guarantee the country’s survival. DAS Yun ends our interview saying that North
Korea’s ultimate reason for pursuing nuclear weapons is regime survival, “that is why we
have to put forward to them that really we are not about regime change, rather if they give up
nuclear weapons there will be a future for them. But the problem right now is that they really
don’t believe that”. This statement is essential in our understanding of this issue, because it
shows that in order to achieve foreign policy goals, the United States must build trust and
transparency of its intentions. Threatening fire and fury really only exacerbates the issue.
Lastly, survival is not just a priority for the current regime, but for nearly every citizen as
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well. The mass indoctrination of each citizen has eroded any sense of the individual in North
Korea, forming a mass collective consciousness. Decades of propaganda have developed
each citizen to associate the nation’s survival with their own (Isozaki 2017, 38). This plays a
role in the United States’ ability to make an impact on any decision within the regime, since
there is virtually no chance for compromise if North Korean leaders believe their nation is
threatened in the slightest way.

On the other hand, North Korea’s acts of brinkmanship do not deliver any of its goals
either. Given how difficult it is to understand the goals of such an isolated country, we can
use DAS Yun’s valuable knowledge, “In general, North Korea’s policy is to achieve both
military might as well as economic prosperity. In regards to the United States, I believe their
policy is to get the U.S. to remove or abandon U.S. hostile policy”. What does North Korea
perceive ‘U.S. hostile policy’ to be? DAS Yun describes North Korea’s three main goals to
remove U.S. aggression: “Number one they want a non-aggression pact, number two they
want diplomatic normalization, and number three they want the U.S. not to interfere with
their trading or their relationships as they seek relationships with other countries.”
Regardless, the pursuit of nuclear weapons coupled with direct threats to the United States
mainland will never bring these desired results. Acts of aggression only bring about greater
distrust and The United States has the most powerful armed forces in the world, with over
30,000 soldiers stationed near the North Korean border (Manyin 2017, 19). Moreover, the
U.S. has never shown hesitation to preemptively strike an adversary or retaliate any act of
war with an exponentially larger force. Furthermore, the hawkish nature of the current
President and his lack of military experience increase the odds that any act of aggression will
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be met with “fire and fury”. Ultimately, brinkmanship will never help North Korea or the
United States achieve its foreign policy goals.
These failures highlight some broader problems with brinkmanship on the whole.
Examples throughout history show us that slight miscalculations of risk can have devastating
consequences. The most famous is the brinkmanship and arms race that Germany and Britain
engaged in leading up to World War One, but in reality there are many more times when
brinkmanship turned uncontrollable. Let us remember the Six-Day War in the Sinai between
Egypt and Israel in 1967. After increasingly aggressive rhetoric, as well as the mobilization
of troops and many provocations, Egypt found itself asking for war. Israel felt forced to
attack preemptively to ensure its survival, and destroyed most of its adversaries’ militaries.
Most notably, Israel conquered huge swaths of previously Arab-held territory, and ruled over
millions of Palestinians as a result of the conflict (Slantchev 2005, 11). This lesson is
important right now, as the effects of this unnecessary escalation of brinkmanship still
provide a source of conflict and bloodshed. This conflict has many similarities with the
current brinkmanship between North Korea and the United States. One of the latest
provocations occurred on November 20, 2017 when President Trump placed North Korea
back on the United States’ list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. While this is largely symbolic
as sanctions had already completed isolated North Korea, this further cements North Korea
as an adversary that must be destroyed. In response, on November 28, 2017, North Korea
fired another ballistic missile into the Sea of Japan, travelling an estimated distance of 1000
kilometers. (Davenport 2017). Ultimately, an escalation into full blown war between these
belligerents would leave millions of innocent people dead, and its catastrophic effects would
change our world fundamentally.
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Chapter Three
Diplomatic Alternatives: Departure from Brinkmanship
If the current policy of brinkmanship is not the answer, then what is the best strategy
for North Korea and the United States to achieve foreign policy goals? Renewed diplomatic
initiatives provide the best potential for both countries to attain their desired results. Some
may scoff at the idea that these two countries can be brought together, but history shows us
that diplomacy can work given the right circumstances and amount of effort. Past modes of
thinking, hostile perceptions and mistrust play a large part in the current situation,
perpetuating the stalemate despite huge changes in both governments and the world in
general. President Clinton attempted diplomacy in 1994, and while his efforts fell apart, his
initiatives show that it is possible to engage North Korea diplomatically. Furthermore, the
shortcomings of those efforts reveal ways that future diplomatic initiatives can succeed.

On October 4, 1994, the United States and North Korea signed the Agreed
Framework. On paper it looked like both countries were going to progress past their bitter
history and achieve foreign policy goals. North Korea would halt the construction and
operations of plutonium nuclear reactors at the Yongbyon test facility, in exchange for lightwater nuclear power reactors. For those of us who are unfamiliar with nuclear vernacular:
highly powerful nuclear reactors can be used to produce weapons-grade plutonium, the
primary fissile material used in nuclear weapons, while light-water reactors are limited to
generating power (WNA 2017). The United States would also deliver 500,000 tons of fuel oil
to make up for lost nuclear power while the light water reactors were built. As a further
confidence-building measure, North Korea would allow inspectors from the International
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Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to conduct routine checks at nuclear sites. The framework of
this deal was extremely sound; the fact that the United States would aid North Korea in
building nuclear power reactors for safe purposes should have built trust and common
understanding between the two countries. While most view this deal as a failure, the
agreement wasn’t a complete waste. Thanks to the presence of the IAEA inspectors, North
Korea stopped operations of its 5 megawatt reactor at Yongbyon, and abandoned the
construction of 10 and 50 megawatt reactors as well. Hans Blix, former head of the IAEA,
estimates that North Korea could have hundreds of nuclear weapons by now if the Agreed
Framework had never taken place (Davidson 2008, 36). This is important because it shows
the potential for diplomatic initiatives to help achieve both country’s foreign policy goals.

Overall, Clinton’s Agreed Framework temporarily halted North Korea’s nuclear
weapons program, but fell apart eventually due to a number of reasons. When looking at the
ways in which the Agreed Framework failed, we must ask: can these shortcomings be
corrected if the United States and North Korea attempt diplomacy again? A major theme of
the Agreed Framework’s failure is the lack of follow through and patience. The lack of
quantifiable progress and verifiable end of North Korea’s nuclear weapons sites gave North
Korea serious opportunities to renege on their commitment in the future. While most nuclear
deals are meticulous in their details and outline specific restraints, the actual document of the
Agreed Framework was only a few pages in length (Davidson 2008, 39). Furthermore,
disputes in the United States Congress delayed funding and resources for the construction of
the light water reactors that were promised as part of the deal. These alternate sources of
power were never built, and the annual fuel deliveries to compensate for the sudden lack of
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nuclear power were regularly late. Instead of a formal treaty that must be ratified in
Congress, President Clinton signed the Agreed Framework with an executive order, setting
up a vicious political battle between branches of the government. Many key players in the
Republican-dominated Congress were furious at the President’s moves towards diplomacy
and blocked funding for months on end (Martin 2002, 55). This is important because it shows
that if diplomatic efforts are relaunched, they must be comprehensive and strongly supported.
These details also indicate that diplomacy was never given a full opportunity to work,
suggesting that this strategy may be more fruitful if tried again.

Chase Davidson provides some sound theoretical analysis of the Agreed Framework,
which can be helpful to our understanding of why it failed. He applies neoclassical realism to
the Agreed Framework, arguing that in an international hierarchic system, states will always
adhere to policies of self-help. Thus, when the Soviet Union fell and North Korea lost ties to
a major superpower at the top of the hierarchy, they pursued nuclear weapons to maintain
legitimacy and relevance in the international spectrum. Moreover, Davidson argues that the
world became increasingly unipolar after the Soviet Union’s fall, with the United States as
the world’s sole major superpower. During the Agreed Framework, North Korea saw
potential benefits to engaging diplomatically with the United States, as it would increase their
place in the international hierarchy to ease tensions with such an important player. However,
as promises in the Agreed Framework were not completely fulfilled, North Korea reverted
back to a policy of self-help and nuclear weapons (Davidson 2008, 48). This theoretical
analysis is relevant because it gives a good picture of the broader international system and
how the United States and North Korea fit into that. Additionally, it shows that future
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diplomatic efforts must always be mutually beneficial for North Korea and the U.S., to
satisfy these self-help tendencies.

In 1998, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung initiated a new direction in interKorean relations. This strategy would involve cooperation, peace, and trust-building
initiatives in order to dispel mutual distrust and progress towards reunification. Aptly named
the Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae Jung’s initiative was a strong departure from decades of
espionage and assassination attempts from both sides (Axelblom 2017, 4). Just a few months
after the Sunshine Policy was announced, North Korea launched the Taepodong-1 missile in
an attempt to place a satellite into space. This began the collapse of the Agreed Framework
and a reversal of diplomatic momentum in the United States’ relationship with North Korea.
After the Taepodong-1’s launch, the Clinton Administration ordered a review of United
States policy towards North Korea, prompting several officials to suggest more compliance
measures added on to the Agreed Framework. However, in the last few months of Clinton’s
presidency, the President pushed most of his team’s diplomatic efforts towards other world
crises in the Middle East (Davidson 2008, 34). This is an important turning point because it
highlights the lack of necessary energy given to diplomacy towards North Korea, and implies
that diplomacy could have yielded better results if it was more strongly pursued.

As mentioned in previous chapters, President Bush conducted his own policy review
towards North Korea and drastically changed the direction of Clinton’s diplomatic strategy to
the ‘axis of evil’. In 2002, U.S. intelligence findings uncovered evidence that North Korea
was constructing a uranium enrichment program, violating the Agreed Framework. After
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many months of delaying fuel shipments and prolonging the policy review, Bush
administration officials finally had the evidence to destroy the Agreed Framework. John
Bolton, the Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security in 2002, later
admitted that “this was the hammer I had been looking for to shatter the Agreed Framework”
(Bolton 2007, 106). This is relevant because it helps us understand how diplomatic efforts
might have been more successful if the Bush administration was not so keen on reversing
Clinton’s foreign policy. Ultimately, the United States and North Korea failed to take into
account each other’s perspective and did not establish trust. When both countries moved to
protect their own interests, the other responded defensively and showed no serious interest to
work together.

In our interview, Deputy Assistant Secretary Yun follows this line of thinking when
explaining past failures of diplomatic initiatives. He says that “all of these agreements have
failed because they failed to generate enough mutual trust. Both sides saw it as a problem
that should be sorted out in one setting, and a big agreement.” Instead of a “rush to get [North
Korea] to agree to complete denuclearization, you need more step by step agreements”. This
is important to consider as we form our own foundations for a new course of action.
The failures of the Agreed Framework and Clinton’s diplomacy towards North Korea expose
ways that this strategy could succeed in the future, but let us also think about some more
general benefits of diplomacy as well. The costs of diplomacy are much less risky than
dancing on the brink of total war. Critics of less hostility towards North Korea may argue
that North Korea took advantage of the United States during Clinton’s presidency, and that it
is naive to expect any reciprocation now. As the mainstream media seizes on every
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provocation and negative soundbite, we become fearful and less willing to gain perspective
from the other side. Seo (2008) effectively showed the ways that international media
coverage overemphasizes aggressive buzzwords when reporting on the North Korean-U.S.
conflict.

Nevertheless, diplomatic efforts have evoked much less dangerous responses from North
Korea in the past, and they present a much better option than the current strategy of
brinkmanship. Moreover, the foreign policy goals of each country are not at total odds with
each other, and can actually complement each other given the right circumstances. As DAS
Yun explained, North Korea wants the U.S. to abandon its hostile policies and is only
pursuing nuclear weapons to deter anyone trying to force its regime collapse. The United
States’ primary concern is denuclearization of North Korea, and is not interested in North
Korean regime change or collapse. Thus, these goals can clearly work hand in hand, but have
been limited by misperceptions of threat. One neorealist explanation for war says that the
perceptions of issues between countries become so great that they cannot allow compromise
(Fearon 1995, 382). Many hardliners in the U.S. government and media suggest that they
truly believe this in the case of the United States and North Korea, meaning that the next
rational solution is war. In reality, there are several ways that both countries can achieve
foreign policy goals through negotiations, diplomacy and trust-building.

Specific Steps to Improving Relations
The first step in improving this relationship and achieving both country’s foreign
policy goals is to begin negotiations. While there are lines of communication right now,
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negotiations need to be more open and public to foster a change of atmosphere. In terms of
initiating the negotiation, the United States needs to be prepared to take much greater leaps to
get the process started. Even with North Korea’s new nuclear capability, the United States is
not struggling with the threat of regime collapse in nearly the same way that North Korea is,
thus it has to account for this imbalance of threat. It is true that for the first time in history,
North Korea has the capability to strike anywhere in the continental United States. Ironically,
to prevent this from happening the United States must be willing to take steps to tip the
balance of power slightly in North Korea’s favor and initiate negotiations. The rapid
progression of nuclear weapons in North Korea has shown that giving ultimatums for
negotiation yields only more aggression and unwanted results. Many will argue that opening
up the negotiating table to a such a hostile country makes the United States more vulnerable,
but has engaging in brinkmanship made the United States any safer? It is highly unlikely that
North Korea will ever make any concessions to the United States without some semblance of
insurance against a U.S. invasion. As we previously discussed, North Korea likely feels
threatened to the point of no return based on the United States’ history of toppling
unsatisfactory regimes as well as its part in escalating recent tensions.

Once communication has been established, each country should specifically outline
its foreign policy goals. Moreover, each country should state any objections or issues that it
has with the other’s goals and explain their rationale. Critics might argue that this is a naive
approach to international diplomacy, but by now both countries have quite an extensive
knowledge of the other. By willingly stating these goals, these two nations can gain common
understanding and perspective. Once again, the United States must be slightly more
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forthcoming to accommodate the heightened level of threat North Korea feels. While a nonaggression pact cannot be signed immediately, the United States should be prepared to grant
this if its government is truly serious about denuclearization and not regime change in North
Korea. Many government officials, especially elected ones, will be critical of giving North
Korea this assurance as they are afraid to seem un-American. The United States has been
built on an ideology of moral righteousness and fortitude against opponents. Since its
founding but also with each war it fights, the United States has developed the idea that
conceding first in a conflict represents weakness. An aversion to go to war against a
belligerent actor has become a defiance to the United States’ national myth and struggle. To a
certain extent, this is a major problem limiting the U.S. and the overall relationship from
progressing. In this case with North Korea, making the first concession represents strength
and understanding on the United States’ part. It is much easier to dismiss our opponents as
inhuman and irrational, while it is much harder to understand them and treat them as equals.
Overall, the deep-rooted hostilities between North Korea and the United States require a
deliberate, enduring remediation process.

Before any grand proclamations or agreements are made, the United States and North
Korea must establish a commitment to gain mutual trust. This means planning regular
communication and initiating trust-building measures scheduled frequently enough to
reassure one another. What is most important about these talks and engagements is that they
do not break down if one country disappoints the other. We learned this lesson in the failures
of Bush’s six-party talks, as well as President Obama’s strategic patience. A crucial element
to these first few interactions is the introduction of public diplomacy to build trust. Public
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diplomacy is essentially the engagement of not only foreign governments, but also foreign
publics to achieve policy goals. Efe Sevin identifies 5 major activities as part of public
diplomacy: listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy and international
broadcasting (Sevin 2017). While some of these activities present major challenges to the
isolated North Korean state like international broadcasting, others are more feasible. Cultural
diplomacy, which is the targeted exchange of cultural programs to educate foreign publics
about host cultures, has viable potential for success. In addition, advocacy and exchange
programs can also work to engage the publics of North Korea and the United States.

Some serious questions arise as we weigh public diplomacy options, namely how can
we expect the North Korean regime to accept public diplomacy measures given the lack of
freedom it gives to its citizens? It is true that in most cases North Koreans are strictly
forbidden from leaving the country and those who try are dealt harsh punishments. As
recently as November 22, 2017, North Korean soldier Oh daringly evaded his comrades
across the border and was shot several times as he dashed into South Korea. The North
Korean fear of regime collapse is so deep that it does not trust its own citizens anymore.
However, this does not make cultural exchanges and public diplomacy impossible. Sports
tournaments, creative competitions, and even limited university exchanges can initiate a
meaningful beginning of trust between North Korea and the United States. North Korea must
be reassured constantly that these exchanges do not attempt to indoctrinate or sway North
Koreans with American propaganda. It is also important that in the beginning, U.S.
exchanges to North Korea do not deliver food or gifts that could be seen as bribes. One of the
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first few steps requires the reversal of President Trump’s travel ban on North Koreans
entering the United States.

Additionally, a cultural exchange targets the minds and hearts of the people, as most
Americans and North Koreans have a polarized view of each other despite having the same
innate wants and needs (Isozaki 2017, 15). It is also true that North Koreans may have a
much harsher view of Americans, given the high level of target indoctrination the regime
delivers them. Thus, it is very important to initiate trust through healthy competition and
fairness. In conjunction with these trust-building initiatives, both the United States and North
Korea should send permanent envoys to the other country. This may not even need to be a
government representative, simply some kind of cultural ambassador. Establishing a constant
presence in a foreign country exponentially increases the likelihood of diplomatic
cooperation (Melissen 2007, 8).

Sevin (2017) also discusses how public diplomacy is much more effective when
employed through a multilayered approach. In this case, socialization (engaging the masses)
is also just as important as direct influence (engaging influential leaders). An example of
direct influence is the International Visitor Leadership Program, which brings “current and
emerging foreign leaders in a variety of fields to experience the U.S. firsthand and cultivate
lasting relationships with their American counterparts” (ECA 2017). The engagement of
North Korean regime leaders in the United States has a high potential for building the
foundations for trust. Furthermore, cultural exchanges and public diplomacy will positively
affect views of North Koreans in the United States, and soften policymakers’ actions towards
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North Korea given the democratic nature of the U.S. Critics will likely wonder, how can we
allow cultural exchanges when nuclear war seems right around the corner? But in reality,
how can we expect to resolve such important issues when we lack the basic foundations for
trust between peoples? Cultural exchanges are a beginning, and should be followed with
more serious public meetings of key leaders. A major priority for the United States should be
to convince the North Korean regime it is not interested in regime change or collapse (as
DAS Yun explained), while a major priority for North Korea should be to convince the
United States it simply wants the abandonment of hostile U.S. policy, not nuclear
armageddon. Both priorities require trust before any further steps are made. A key point to
remember is that there is very little chance that North Korea would drop a nuclear bomb on
the United States if serious efforts were being made to satisfy North Korean goals, thus this
issue is only as urgent and volatile as we make it. Both nations can delve into specific policy
goals such as denuclearization and non-interference only after we engage the public in both
these countries and establish mutual understanding.

Under these circumstances, the two governments can begin to advance toward
specific foreign policy goals. In exchange for a U.S. vow of non-interference with the North
Korean regime, North Korea must immediately halt nuclear activities and missile tests. An
important aspect of this step is establishing accountability measures for both sides. We have
seen the problems in past administrations with the lack of accountability and failure to take
responsibility for inconsistency. North Korea’s denuclearization should be absolute in the
long-term, but cannot be expected to completed overnight. Both sides must agree on a
specific timeline that involves key, verifiable actions to denuclearize North Korea.
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Furthermore, each step to denuclearize North Korea should be matched with a
corresponding action by the United States to satisfy North Korea’s goals. Throughout this
process, third party observers from the United Nations or even other countries will verify the
accomplishment of each goal. Agreeing to equitable actions is perhaps the hardest part of this
process, but is crucial to maintain this shaky partnership. For example, the United States can
ease off certain sanctions for every verified closure of a North Korean nuclear facility. The
United States must be willing to pledge non-interference in the North Korean regime while at
the same time remaining committed to regional partners South Korea and Japan. At this
stage, there will undeniably be harsh critics, delays and even stagnation in the process. The
United States’ capricious electorate and transitory lawmakers make consistency difficult.
Congress must sign certain measures into law and regard diplomacy with North Korea with
the same importance that they reserve for any domestic issue. As a result, there must be
massive public awareness campaigns and support for diplomacy with North Korea to
convince lawmakers of its importance.

To ensure mutual consistency from the onset, both the United States and North Korea
should agree on a penalty system if the other reneges on a certain commitment. Just as the
United States and North Korea reward each other for complying with each other’s terms,
they must also be appropriately punitive. Punishments for moving backward in specific DAS
Yun shares this point in our interview, as he says the process of diplomacy involves
“juggling many things together, and a big part of that is pressure policy including sanctions”.
It may seem counterintuitive to admit the possibility of infidelity to the terms, especially with
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such a weak baseline of trust. However, as history has taught us, there are a variety of factors
at play in this relationship: security concerns, regional alliances, economic trends, and global
affairs just to name a few. This is important because it deals with the fact that many past
negotiations fell apart after single events, and confronts the past difficulty to initiate a
positive relationship afterwards. Thus, lowering expectations for one another makes the
relationship less likely to fall apart after one bad day, while increasing the commitment levels
of both countries. Ultimately, both countries must prepare for a gradual, difficult process to
ease tension and avert the escalation of force.

Conclusion
The relationship between the United States and North Korea is one of the most
pressing issues of our time. Whatever happens in the next stages of this clash will impact
millions of people around the world. Furthermore, the ability to prevent nuclear war and
settle this dispute peacefully not only determines the direction of these two nations, but the
future of the human race. As a species we have never used weapons as deadly as the ones we
currently possess, and the choice to use them or not use them will define the scope of human
progress for years to come. Moreover, the fate of this relationship could represent humanity’s
incredible ability to move forward and mediate decades of conflict. By working together,
these countries can provide hope for other seemingly unsolvable disputes. At the time of
writing, the United States and North Korea seem destined to collide in deadly battle. It is
important to remember that with patience, commitment, and mutual understanding, both
countries can work together achieve foreign policy goals.
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In this paper, we discussed the failure of recent policies by the Clinton, Bush and
Obama administrations. Through critical thinking and multiple perspectives, we attempted to
perform an objective analysis of how both North Korea and the United States have developed
skewed perceptions of the other, and how these perceptions have affected their ability to
achieve their respective goals. These biases have caused each side to alienate one another and
therefore forget their opponent’s rights and needs of self-defense. Throughout the paper, we
developed lessons to use for a new foreign policy strategy of renewed diplomatic relations
and decline of tension. This new course of action relies on mutual trust, public diplomacy
and deep commitment to help both countries accomplish foreign policy goals that have
evaded these nations for so long. More importantly, this new course of action provides the
pathway to a much safer world.
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Appendix: Interview with U.S. State Department Special Representative for North
Korea Policy: Deputy Assistant Secretary Joseph Yun

Benjamin: Can you explain this administration’s goals dealing with North Korea?

DAS Yun: Okay, Benjamin, the goal is very clear. We want to denuclearize North Korea, so
it’s very clear we want North Korea to get rid of its nuclear weapons. What perhaps I should
add is that this administration’s policy is not to seek regime change, and it is also not to seek
regime collapse, it is not to seek accelerated reunification, it is also not to use any of this to
place US troops beyond the DMZ. So, it is about denuclearization it is not about regime
change or collapse.

Benjamin: Okay, great. So throughout my research I’ve had a bit of trouble identifying
North Korea’s foreign policy goals, could you talk about what you think North Korea’s goals
are in dealing with the United States?

DAS Yun: I think in general North Korea’s policy is to achieve both military might as well
as economic prosperity. In regards to the United States, I believe their policy is to get the
U.S. to remove or abandon U.S. hostile policy. Now you might want to ask, what are the
elements that they perceive as being hostile? I would say in order to remove U.S. hostile
policy, they in fact said this in some kind of statement in 2003, it contains three elements.
Number one they want a non-aggression pact, number two they want diplomatic
normalization, and number three they want the U.S. not to interfere with their trading or their
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relationships as they seek relationships with other countries. I believe those are the elements
of hostile policy that they see. That becomes then a derivative, how do they make sure that
they get to those? They are saying the only way we can ensure we can have a strong military
status as well as making sure there is non-interference from the U.S. is by having equality in
nuclear arsenals. So yes that is what their policy is, I believe.

Benjamin: Can you give some background as to what an average day for you is like
advancing this administration’s goals?

DAS Yun: My main job is to seek engagement and peaceful resolution to the nuclear issue in
North Korea. My job is also to coordinate government-wide our North Korea policy. So, it is
about many things but it is you know your typical FSO job dealing with a country but this
one just happens to be North Korea. And so I communicate to North Koreans, I am probably
the only one in the U.S. government that communicates regularly to North Koreans. I
communicate to them through what’s called New York channels. North Koreans have an
office, they have a mission to the United Nations. So, part of that mission deals with U.S.
issues, so that’s more like a message center more than anything else and they communicate
with Pyongyang. So I try to convey to them what we want and so on. Second aspect of what I
do is coordinating our pressure policies: what do we do on sanctions? What do we do in
order to diplomatically isolate them? And then you know anything that goes on, for example
yesterday you saw another ICBM launch. We have to arrange phone calls at the heads of
state level, we have to arrange phone calls for our Secretary, we have to do press statements,
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we have to respond to other inquiries, and we have to get together among ourselves on how
we should react, what are the next steps and so on.

Benjamin: That’s really fascinating. I had no idea about that level of communication. Just
speaking off that, what are some regular challenges that you encounter in achieving those
goals and going through processes?

DAS Yun: I think the biggest challenge is of course the North Korean problem, especially
their very rapid development of nuclear and missile programs has made it a legitimate
security challenge for the United States, now for the continental United States. As of now, I
believe, their ICBMs can probably reach all parts of the continental United States and if you
marry that with nuclear weapons it’s a very big threat, which is why we keep saying this is
the number one security issue for the U.S. So really since I’ve taken this job, since October
last year, this has become not just a threat for the neighbors like South Korea and Japan, it’s
become a threat for the homeland. So when it happens that way, it gets very high-level
attention. It gets the President’s attention and of course our Secretary’s attention and when it
becomes that way and when North Korea continues to test their weapons it becomes a
threatening item. So we are very frustrated, and so you will see people getting very angry
with them and then Congress getting into the act and of course the Press leading us to more
and more hardline policies, and then the North Koreans responding more and more
aggressively. So it becomes like a vicious cycle and it is hard to get out. So that is the biggest
difficult Benjamin.
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Benjamin: Right, I’ve definitely seen that in analyzing all the reading about on North Korea.
How large is the State Department’s role in the overall US-North Korea relationship?

DAS Yun: Our role is of course is you know, strictly one of coordination and diplomatic
initiatives. So I think you’ve seen this, everyone has made it clear including the President, the
Secretary of State, Secdef Mattis, that this is a really diplomatic problem to resolve. We are
not ready to have a military solution to it, nor are we prepared for a military solution. So that
makes it a State Department problem, and this is what we are coming to terms with. Right
now, we have the lead on the diplomatic aspect of it trying to get a dialogue going, trying to
put in our mind what we need to seek and what we need to accomplish. It is not an easy task
as you can imagine. The North Korean nuclear program started in the 1960’s, so we’ve had
this challenge for many many decades and it’s a tough challenge to deal with in terms of
asking a country to give up weapons that they believe are needed for their own defense.

Benjamin: Given the news and press clippings recently, it makes one quite cynical. Do you
think that diplomacy is possible in the near future given how heated tensions have been
recently?

DAS Yun: Yes, I think we still have a lot of room for diplomacy. I think ultimately it has to
be settled diplomatically. Diplomacy doesn’t just mean talking of course, I think it means
juggling many things together, a big part of that is pressure policy including sanctions,
including sanctions not just against North Korea but those who help North Korea such as
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China, Russia and so on. It means trying to isolate them but it also means trying to point to
them that there could be a better future for them. So it is a big challenge and I don’t think that
we should think of diplomatic solutions as just coming out with an agreement or a piece of
paper at the end. I think rather it is also about getting to the point where there is more trust
between the two countries, more of a relationship that should be managed in the positive
direction, a relationship in which you can resolve problems. So I would say diplomacy is a
process and along the way there will be many steps in which you have to make an agreement
on different issues.

Benjamin: Speaking of diplomatic initiatives, a large part of my paper talks about the
failures of President Clinton’s Agreed Framework, do you think the Agreed Framework
could have been successful with a more united effort from the US government?

DAS Yun: I think all of these agreements have failed because they failed to generate enough
mutual trust and they rather saw it as a problem that should be sorted out in one setting, and a
big agreement. I think I mentioned that’s why I think we need to go step by step, building
trust in between,and by trust I don’t just mean good feelings, but concrete evidence that it
cannot be pulled back so easily. So, you may want to go to step one, which could be a freeze
and perhaps open a diplomatic liason office or something so discussions can continue. And
then when you feel good about it, move to step two, which could be disablement and so on. It
is my personal view that we need to do that rather than rush to get them to agree to complete
denuclearization, I think that’s going to be tough which is why my own personal view is that
you need more step by step agreements and then in between build confidence, say through
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economic assistance, or through exchanges, having North Korean students here, allowing
American NGOs to go there, and so you build something while you’re doing it.

Benjamin: In your opinion, do you think North Korea’s nuclear ambitions come from a need
to maintain security and balanced threat with the United States, or do they have real intention
of using them?

DAS Yun: I think the origin of North Korean nuclear weapons is really the realization that
economically, or culturally, they could no longer compete with South Korea. So they realized
after the fall of the Soviet Union that their sponsors, they helpers, have disappeared and that
they were losing this battle with South Korea that is competition. And so it is now obvious,
South Korean per capita income is probably 20 times greater than North Korea and South
Korean GDP is probably about 40 times greater than North Korea. There is no way they can
compete with South Korea economically and there is no way they can compete with South
Korea through conventional weapons. So I think you must remember that North Korea has
always had the dream of reunification of the Korean Peninsula under North Korean terms.
Not only is that dream gone, but they were facing extinction or if you want to put it regime
survival. I think they felt that they had to go the route of getting nuclear weapons in order to
number one compete with South Korea, and number two post legitimate deterrents against
anyone wishing to force them to essentially give up or have a system of government they did
not want or change the regime. So I think those are the main reasons, but ultimately it is
geared towards regime survival. I think that is why they want to have nuclear weapons and
that is why we have put forward to them that really we are not about regime change, rather if
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they give up nuclear weapons there will be a future for them. But the problem right now is
that they really don’t believe that.
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